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Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competition
Laws
forthcoming in: Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht / Journal of Competition Law, Vol. 1 (4), 2003.
Can "competition of competition laws" be a feasible concept that should play an important role
in an international order for the worldwide protection of competition? We introduce four
different types of regulatory competition that allow for a more differentiated analysis of
beneficial and deficient effects of competition of competition laws. Our analysis shows that most
types of regulatory competition have a rather limited scope for application to competition laws.
However, yardstick competition can be very promising and represents a powerful argument
against centralisation. An important result of our analysis is that the institutional framework of
any competition of competition laws plays a crucial role for its workability.
JEL-Classification: F 020, K 210, L 400
I. Introduction
During recent years, an intensive discussion about the internationalisation of competition policy
as a response to market globalisation has risen. One controversial issue is the question of
coordination, convergence and harmonisation of competition laws both on a global level (WTO,
ICN) and within the supranational competition law regime of the European Union (modernisation
debate). Although many scholars put forward arguments in favour of a greater convergence or
even (minimum) harmonisation of competition laws, there is also vigorous opposition. One line
of thought prefers, instead, a beneficial competition of competition laws as the adequate answer
to the challenges of market globalisation. This is a very specific argument that refers to the
concept of institutional or regulatory competition, drawing particularly on the famous example of
competition of U.S. corporate laws. Other authors reject this argument, pointing to loopholes,
                                                
∗ Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Kerber, Chair of Economic Policy, Department of Economics, Philipps-University of
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inefficiencies and conflicts in the current system of national competition laws and emphasising
negative effects of a failing competition of competition laws.
Thus, there is a vital discussion whether "competition of competition laws" is a feasible concept
and whether it represents an important argument in the discussion about an international order for
the worldwide protection of competition. However, even a brief analysis of this issue already
reveals that it seems to be very unclear what exactly the meaning of "competition of competition
laws" is. Therefore, our first concern is to clarify possible meanings and mechanisms of this
specific kind of regulatory competition. Drawing on the general theory of regulatory competition,
we suggest to differentiate between four types of regulatory competition in order to distinguish
four meanings of "competition of competition laws": (I) regulatory competition via mutual
learning (yardstick competition), (II) regulatory competition via international trade, (III)
regulatory competition via locational (interjurisdictional) competition, and (IV) regulatory
competition via free choice of law. Having introduced these four different meaning of
competition of competition laws, we can analyse each type concerning its role in the literature, its
implications and its feasibility in regard to an international competition policy regime.
Our main result is that an elaborated and detailed analysis leads to very differentiated
assessments about the feasibility of regulatory competition of competition laws. It depends
crucially on both the specific type of competition of competition laws and specific institutional
preconditions whether these competition processes lead to an improvement or a deterioration of
competition laws. We show that competition of competition laws is beneficial in the sense that a
decentralised system of competition law regimes allows for experimentation and mutual learning
about the best ways to protect competition. However, competition of competition laws via
international trade, locational competition or choice of law includes the danger of considerable
failures and, therefore, needs an adequate institutional framework that impedes defective
processes of regulatory competition. Altogether, our results support a sceptical position to
regulatory competition in regard to competition laws while simultaneously emphasising the
benefits of a decentralised multi-level system of competition laws with an appropriate
institutional framework that ensures its proper working.
This paper is organised as follows: in section 2, four types of regulatory competition in regard to
competition law are differentiated. Section 3 represents the main part of the paper and provides a
detailed analysis of the mechanisms, implications and problems of each type of competition of
competition laws. Based on a short overall assessment of the feasibility and desirability of
different types of competition of competition laws, section 4 discusses briefly the perspective of a
decentralised multi-level system of competition laws (antitrust federalism) as a promising avenue
for international competition policy.
II. Possible Meanings of "Competition of Competition Laws": Four Types of
Regulatory Competition
"Competition of competition laws" represents a special case of the general concept of regulatory
competition. The theoretical analyses of regulatory competition is closely linked to the
discussions about interjurisdictional (and locational) competition, systems competition,
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centralisation versus decentralisation, and competitive federalism.
1 Concerning policy
applications, the discussions about the merits and problems of competition among U.S. corporate
laws
2 and about centralisation / harmonisation vs. decentralisation of legal rules and regulations
within the EU (Cassis de Dijon-Judgment of the European Court of Justice)
3 are particular
important. Our analysis of regulatory competition in regard to competition law regimes draws on
the insights of these discussions.
So far, it cannot be claimed that a thorough, well-elaborated general theory of regulatory
competition exists. The main issues of these discussions refer to the question whether regulatory
competition can work satisfactorily, i.e. that these competition processes lead to an improvement
of legal rules ("race to the top"), or whether, vice versa, processes of regulatory competition will
fail, implying a deterioration of the quality of legal rules ("race to the bottom"). Although much
research still has to be done, theoretical and empirical research shows that no general answer can
be given. The working properties of regulatory competition seem to depend crucially on specific
preconditions, the institutional framework for regulatory competition, and the kind of legal rules
and regulations itself.
4
This general debate, however, is also characterised by the problem that the term "regulatory
competition" is used either in very different ways or rather vaguely. Often, it is not clear whether
regulatory competition is meant as a direct competition of legal rules by choice of law, or as a
more or less indirect one through "voting by feet" (interjurisdictional competition), by the
application of the principle of origin (like within the EU), or simply as a kind of competition of
regulatory concepts and theories. As it will be demonstrated in section 3, the difference matters:
each type of regulatory competition has its own properties and implications and they differ
considerably among those types. Therefore, in the following, four basic types of regulatory
competition are distinguished according to the extent of mobility between different jurisdictions
(regulatory regimes) which, consequently, imply different transmission mechanisms for
competition among legal rules or regulations (see Table 1).
5
                                                
1 See e.g. Tiebout (1956), Siebert/Koop (1990), Kenyon/Kincaid (1991), Vanberg/Kerber (1994),
Frey/Eichenberger (1995), Breton (1996), Sinn (1997, 2003), Bratton/McCahery (1997), Kerber (1998),
and Oates (1999).
2 See e.g. Bebchuk (1992), Romano (1985, 1993), and Easterbrook/Fischel (1996).
3 See Woolcock (1994), Sun/Pelkmans (1995), and Kerber (2000b).
4 See Siebert/Koop (1990), Hauser/Hösli (1991), Sun/Pelkmans (1995), Sinn (1997), Gatsios/Holmes
(1998), Van den Bergh (2000), Stephan (2000), and Heine (2003).
5 For this distinction of different types of regulatory competition, see also Kerber (2000a), Heine (2003),
and briefly in respect to competition laws Kerber (2003). Since it is not realistic to assume mobility of
goods/services without mobility of information, the extent of mobility is step-by-step cumulating from
type (I) to (IV). However, this might not be appropriate in all cases. Furthermore, these types are only
basic types, which can be further differentiated.
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Table 1: Types of Regulatory Competition




Information/Theories Goods/Services Factors of
Production
Legal Rules
(I) X - - -
(II) X X - -
(III) X X X -
(IV) X X X X
Type (I)-Regulatory Competition via Mutual Learning (Yardstick Competition): In type (I)-
regulatory competition, the jurisdictions are assumed to be isolated with the exception of
information flows, which allow for mutual learning about the advantages and disadvantages of
different legal rules. Regarding competition laws, this implies that the jurisdictions can learn
from the experiences of the competition policies in other countries. Thus, they can imitate
superior competition law rules or enforcement techniques. In its pure form, this type of regulatory
competition as a process of parallel experimentation and mutual learning can already work
without presupposing that the competition policy of one jurisdiction affects the welfare of other
jurisdictions, i.e. no international markets or an international mobility of individuals, firms, and
factors of production are necessary. The transmission mechanism for the imitation of successful
policies from other jurisdictions is intrajurisdictional political competition, in which voters assess
the performance of their government by comparing it with the performance in other countries
(yardstick competition).
Type (II)-Regulatory Competition via International Trade: This type represents the assumptions
of the traditional theory of international trade: mobility of goods/services and immobility of
factors of production. Since the design of the institutional and legal framework influences the
competitiveness of domestic firms on international markets, there is a kind of indirect
competition between the legal rules of different countries. Since competition laws can influence
the international competitiveness of domestic firms as well, success or failure in international
trade can be an important additional feedback mechanism for competition laws. Therefore,
governments may have incentives to take into account the international competitiveness of
domestic industries in their decisions upon competition policy. This can lead to additional
incentives to improve competition laws, e.g. by learning from superior competition policies of
other countries, but also widens the perspective for strategic competition policies, e.g. lenient
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merger policies, which deliberately avoid fighting the emergence of "national champions" in
order to reap rents from market power on international markets.
Type (III)-Regulatory Competition via Interjurisdictional Competition: If we extend type (II)-
regulatory competition to include the mobility of individuals, firms, and factors of production
(particularly capital), direct competition for mobile factors among different jurisdictions emerges
(interjurisdictional competition). This type (III)-regulatory competition implies, in contrast to
type (II), that legal rules and regulations can be chosen by moving between jurisdictions.
Consequently, jurisdictions can shape their competition laws to attract investments of firms and,
then, competition of competition laws becomes part of interjurisdictional competition. This is a
much more direct form of regulatory competition than in the case of type (II), providing
additional incentives for the improvement of competition laws or strategic competition policies.
Type (IV)-Regulatory Competition via Free Choice of Law: An additional type can be
distinguished, if individuals and firms can directly choose between legal rules of different
jurisdictions without having to move (physically) their location (direct choice of law). The
already mentioned competition of corporate laws in the U.S. serves as an example of this type
(IV)-regulatory competition. The advantage in comparison to type (III) is that particular
regulations can be chosen without having to accept the whole bundle of public goods, taxes, and
regulations of the respective jurisdiction. This can lead to a much more intensive regulatory
competition, as it could be observed in the case of U.S. corporate laws. In regard to competition
laws, this type would imply that firms can choose directly between different competition law
regimes independent from their location or the markets in which they do business.
The mobility determining the type of competition of competition laws depends on (1) real
mobility conditions (like costs of transportation, communication and moving costs, etc.) and (2)
legal rules that determine to what extent mobility of goods / services, individuals, firms, factors
of production, or legal rules (by choice of law) is allowed or restricted.
6 Considering competition
law, the most important of these rules is the wide-spread "effects doctrine", i.e. that each
jurisdiction claims to apply its competition law to all restraints of competition that have
restricting effects on competition within its own territory, wherever those restraints of
competition take place.
7 If this extra-territorial application of competition laws was enforced
perfectly, it would have serious consequences for the possibility of some types of competition of
competition laws, because it would imply that firms wanting to do business in a particular
jurisdiction would not have the actual freedom to choose between different competition laws,
neither through direct choice of competition laws nor through moving their location to another
jurisdiction. However, due to the limited enforceability of domestic competition laws in foreign
countries, the effects doctrine, in reality, does not exclude necessarily the possibility of these
types of competition of competition laws. It becomes clear, in any case, that the rules defining the
extent of the competencies of competition law regimes are crucial for our analysis of the
possibility and working properties of different types of regulatory competition.
                                                
6 Various kinds of barriers to international trade, barriers to migration or establishment of firms, or
restrictions of free choice of law influence the type and extent of regulatory competition.
7 See Basedow (1998).
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Another important dimension is the multi-level structure of existing competition laws. Within the
EU, there are competition laws and competition authorities on two different jurisdictional levels:
both on the national level of the EU Member States and on the EU level. Also in the U.S., a two-
level structure (federal and state level) is effective, particularly in regard to the enforcement of
antitrust laws.
8 The establishment of (additional) international competition rules would lead to a
three-level structure of competition law regimes. Consequently, competition of competition laws
can take place horizontally between competition laws of the same jurisdictional level (as between
German and French competition policy) and vertically, e.g. between competition law regimes of
the EU and its member states. Discussing competition of competition laws from this perspective
of a multi-level system of competition laws shows that this debate is closely linked to the
discussion on centralisation versus decentralisation of competition law regimes, and, therefore, to
the possibility to apply the concept of federalism to competition laws (federalism in antitrust).
9
III. Analysis of Different Types of Competition of Competition Laws
1. Type (I)-Competition of Competition Laws: via Mutual Learning (Yardstick
Competition)
1.1 Introduction
Many proponents of the idea of competition of competition laws emphasise that the parallel
existence of different competition laws allows jurisdictions to learn from each other how to carry
out competition policy successfully.
10 Some of them stress beneficial effects of decentralisation
and diversity of competition laws on principle.
11 Others argue that mutual learning processes
alleviate the convergence of competition laws, e.g. by identifying best practices and spreading
them.
12 Whereas the first position remains sceptical to convergence and harmonisation and
promotes decentralisation and diversity to be a permanent feature of the international protection
of competition, the latter understands the process of mutual learning as an instrument for
achieving convergence. This approach is also called ex-post or market-based harmonisation in
contrast to ex-ante harmonisation via political agreements on harmonised rules. In the following,
these – at first sight – rather vague arguments are analysed in more detail within the framework
                                                
8 For the two-level structure of competition laws in Europe, see Mavroidis/Neven (2000), Van den
Bergh/Camesasca (2001, pp.136-165), and Bergeron (2001); for analyses on U.S. federalism in antitrust,
see Easterbrook (1983), Kovacic (1992, 1996), Hovenkamp (1999, pp. 721-745), Sullivan/Grimes (2000,
pp. 536-556, 887-967), and Posner (2001, 2003). The U.S. system is additionally characterised by an
unique importance of private litigation.
9 For first approaches to apply federalism to competition policy see Easterbrook (1983), Hawk/Laudati
(1996), Fox (2000), Guzman (2001), and Kerber (2003).
10 See Meessen (1989), Nicolaides (1992, 1994), Van den Bergh (1996), First (1998), and
Freytag/Zimmermann (1998).
11 See Ullrich (1998), Budzinski (2002a), and Kerber (2003).
12 See Nicolaides (1994) and Freytag/Zimmermann (1998) as well as the cautious approach of First (1998)
towards a "best-rule-harmonization" through regulatory competition. The best practice approach is also
one important goal of the International Competition Network (ICN). See Budzinski (2003) and First
(2003).
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of the conditions of type (I)-regulatory competition, i.e. that only information flows are relevant
between different countries, in which competition laws protect competition in domestic markets
independently from each other.
1.2 Knowledge Problems and the Quality of Competition Laws
The theoretical background of this line of argument about experimentation and mutual learning
can be traced back to basic epistemological reasoning of Hayek and Popper about the
fundamental limitations of our knowledge, particularly in regard to the appropriate rules for
human societies. Popper (1972) emphasised the fallibility of human knowledge and, therefore,
characterised the growth of knowledge as the outcome of processes of trial and error.
13 Hayek
(1970) elaborated extensively on the fundamental knowledge problems that policy makers have
to face, leading him to a profound scepticism regarding the capability of governments to
influence successfully the outcome of market processes. If we take Hayeks “knowledge problem”
seriously, a crucial consequence arises. We must not assume that governments (or even academic
scholars) already know the best legal rules in advance. Therefore, existing legal rules might not
only be deficient because of rent-seeking problems but also due to fundamental knowledge
problems. Consequently, particularly in the long run, a legal system should have a high
endogenous capability for improving the knowledge about the quality of its legal rules by
innovation and adaptation. From this Popperian and Hayekian perspective, the establishment of
processes of parallel experimentation with legal rules in different jurisdictions (and mutual
learning from these experiences) are a crucial device for dealing with these knowledge
problems.
14
In order to understand the importance of the knowledge-generating effects of parallel
experimentation and learning concerning the protection of competition, we should take into
account that each competition law regime consists of a complex set of many rules, institutions,
theories, and practices that determine its overall quality:
15
(1)  Different substantial competition rules can be expected to lead to different qualities of
competition law. This refers both to the legal texts itself (like the Sherman Act, the German
"GWB", or Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty), but also to the official guidelines and
communications for the application of these laws. Additionally, the appropriateness of
general legal terms can be different, like, e.g., the U.S. concept of "substantially lessening
of competition" in comparison with the "market dominance test" in the EU.
                                                
13  Popper (1972, p. 255) claimed an universal Darwinian concept of the growth of knowledge, based upon
the principle of trial and error elimination. This eventually leads to the approach of evolutionary
epistemology. See also Campbell (1987) and Vanberg (1994).
14 From the evolutionary perspective of Popper, parallel processes of experimentation with mutual
learning can be understood as evolutionary processes of variation, retention and selection, leading to the
sifting of superior solutions and, therefore, to a growth of knowledge (Popper 1972). For a very similar
notion see Hayek's theory of cultural evolution (Hayek 1973; Vanberg 1994). In legal discussions about
the advantages and disadvantages of uniformity versus diversity of law, variety and experimentation with
new legal rules and mutual learning have also been seen as an important advantage of diversity of law. See
e.g. Behrens (1986, pp. 238), Parisi/Ribstein (1998), Ogus (1999), and Van den Bergh (2000).
15 The following four categories should not be viewed as strictly separable.
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(2)  Each competition law regime has a set of procedural rules, like filing requirements,
deadlines and time schedules for merger procedures, investigation rights, rules for the
dealing with confidential business information, sanction mechanisms in the case of non-
compliance, etc.. Other aspects of the quality of enforcement include the organisation of
competition authorities for public enforcement and courts as well as rules that determine the
extent and the incentives for private enforcement of competition rules. The degree of
independence from political and private influence, which competition agencies possess
plays an important role.
(3)  The application of substantial competition rules also depends on the specific theories of
competition (industrial economics) that are used by competition authorities (including
courts), because they provide the set of criteria for assessing particular cases. Using
different theories, e.g. about entry barriers or predatory pricing, can lead to a different
quality of competition laws.
(4)  Beyond that, there is a set of (more technical) practices, e.g. methods to define relevant
markets or to determine turnovers (for market shares or turnover thresholds).
Each one of these many elements of a competition law regime can be more or less appropriate.
Although theoretical and empirical studies can provide valuable information from which we learn
extensively, we have to accept that the above-mentioned knowledge problems exist in relation to
nearly all of these elements of competition law regimes. Although there is a wide-spread
consensus on some basic elements, like the positive assessment of the existence of merger
reviews or the prohibition of hardcore cartels, our knowledge about the best set of criteria for
reviewing mergers or exempting cartels or about the most appropriate procedural rules is a rather
limited. Therefore, experiences with already implemented rules, established competition
authorities, and applied theories and practices are an important source of valuable information.
16
1.3 Experimentation, Mutual Learning, and Competition
If there are different competition law regimes in different countries, and mutual observation of
these competition policies and their relative success (or failure) is possible (as assumed in type
(I)-regulatory competition), governments, competition authorities staff, and citizens (as voters)
can use the experiences of other countries to reassess their own competition law regimes. This
allows for correcting errors, imitating superior legal rules, enforcement mechanisms, theories and
practices, or simply avoiding mistakes others have made.
17
What examples can be given for mutual learning concerning competition policy? Most important
is the innovation of modern competition policy by the establishment of U.S. antitrust policy at the
end of the 19
th century itself, which spread in the second half of the 20
th century into many
industrialised countries, and its increasing diffusion into developing countries since the 1990s.
Such innovation-imitation-processes can also be observed when considering particular
instruments of competition policy, e.g. merger control, in regard to specific practices, e.g.
                                                
16 Competition law regimes have in many respects the characteristics of an experience good, i.e.,
information about their quality can only be generated  through the use of the competition law.
17 Even if one competition law regime might seem in general superior to another, it cannot be expected
that it is superior in regard to all substantial and procedural rules, theories and practices. This ensures the
mutuality of learning from others in respect to at least some traits of the competition law regime.
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methods for defining relevant markets, or in regard to specific theories, e.g. the spreading of
arguments of Chicago economics for the evaluation of vertical restraints or the theory of
Contestable Markets concerning the assessment of entry conditions. Additionally, the current
discussions in European competition policy whether the "efficiency defence" should be
introduced in European merger control or whether the concept of "substantially lessening of
competition" might be superior to the "market dominance test" are examples for the possibility of
learning from each other. Particularly interesting would be a detailed analysis about mutual
learning processes between the German and the European competition law regime. As a general
outline, one can suppose that until the 1980s the European competition policy learned much from
the more developed German competition policy, whereas since the 1990s the main direction of
learning (and imitation) has been reversed.
18 This demonstrates that in a multi-level system of
competition law regimes processes of experimentation and mutual learning are also possible
between competition law regimes on different jurisdictional levels (vertical dimension).
Can we, however, label these processes of parallel experimentation and mutual learning as
"competition processes"? In our opinion, the term can be used if we do not narrow down
"competition" to the model of perfect competition but, instead, use it in a theoretically broader
way. Both the Schumpeterian concept of competition as innovation-imitation-processes and the
Hayekian concept of "competition as a discovery procedure" can be interpreted as encompassing
the notion of parallel experimentation with new problem solutions and the imitation of the
successful solutions by others through learning. In these evolutionary concepts of competition,
which can be analysed as variation-selection-processes, new knowledge about the solving of
problems (here: the protection of competition) is endogenously generated and spread.
19 Closely
linked to this concept of competition is the concept of yardstick competition, which is well
known in the discussion on interjurisdictional and regulatory competition. The basic idea of
yardstick competition is that information about the quality of the performance of governments or
policies (and legal rules) is revealed by comparing it with the performance of others. In this
respect, the concept of yardstick competition comprises implicitly the notion of parallel
experimentation and ex-post revelation of superior solutions.
20
Nevertheless, the positive knowledge-generating effects of parallel experimentation presuppose
that there is some diversity in regard to the competition policies of different jurisdictions.
Therefore, a crucial conclusion is that type (I)-competition of competition laws implies (1) the
right of the jurisdictions to decide freely on the details of their competition policies and (2) the
acceptance of a certain diversity of the competition policies of all jurisdictions. From this
perspective, the endeavours to achieve convergence (or even harmonisation and centralisation) of
                                                
18 The last revision of the German Law Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) comprised several
imitations of European competition rules, e.g. the imitation of the EU rule on cartel exemptions (Art.
81(3) EC Treaty as "Sonderkartelle" (§ 7 GWB) or procedural rules for merger control.
19 See for evolutionary concepts of competition Schumpeter (1934), Hayek (1978), Kerber (1997), Kirzner
(1997), and Budzinski (2000); for applications of evolutionary concepts of competition to
interjurisdictional and regulatory competition see Vihanto (1992), Vanberg/Kerber (1994), and
Streit/Wohlgemuth (1999).
20 The concept of yardstick competition can be traced back to Shleifer (1985). In the theory of
interjurisdictional and regulatory competition it was introduced by Salmon (1987). For modelling the
search for new policy solutions in decentralized federal systems with learning from others, see
Kollman/Miller/Page (2000).
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competition law regimes (particularly on the global level) hampers or even eliminates the
beneficial knowledge-generating (error-correcting) effects of experimentation and mutual
learning.
From a Hayekian evolutionary point of view, the concept of competition of competition laws as a
device for ex-post harmonisation is also misleading. The benefits of endogenous knowledge
creation are not a temporary phenomenon, leading to an optimal solution, which makes further
learning unnecessary. Instead, processes of mutual learning have to take place permanently in
order to secure error tolerance and allow for continuing improvements as well as adaptations to
changing environments. The fundamental knowledge problem is never finally solved. Therefore,
the advantages of experimentation and mutual learning should be maintained in an international
system of competition laws, which requires a certain degree of diversity which is not only
tolerated but even seen as a fundamental precondition for the future workability and adaptive
flexibility of the system, despite other problems that may result from these differences.
1.4 Problems and Relevance
Several groups of problems and obstacles to a satisfactory workability of type (I)-competition of
competition laws require discussion:
21
(1) If the aims of competition policy (or other important conditions) differ to a considerable
extent between jurisdictions, different competition law regimes might be best for different
countries. In this case, the potential for mutual learning may be limited. Similar problems will
arise, if transplanting of particular rules or policy instruments from one competition law regime
to another is difficult, because compatibility problems with other parts of the legal system emerge
or the same rules have different effects in combination with another legal environment (like e.g.
another court system).
22
(2) From the Hayekian perspective, it cannot be expected that comparative assessments of the
experiences with legal rules, theories, and practices are without errors. Therefore, one cannot rule
out that in some cases the relatively best solutions are not identified, leading to the danger of the
imitation of “wrong” competition policies. A more important problem is that incentives within
the jurisdictions, particularly through politically influential rent seeking-coalitions, may lead
governments to deliberately imitate welfare-reducing competition policies, for instance, by
protecting special interests through cartel exemptions or selective non-enforcement. Processes of
experimentation and mutual learning alone cannot ensure that superior competition policies are
selected and spread. If the intrajurisdictional political processes that ultimately decide on the
competition law regime are systematically deficient, type (I)-regulatory competition can also lead
to the learning of inferior policies and, therefore, to a deterioration of competition law regimes.
These problems, however, can be solved effectively only by addressing the cause of the
deficiencies: the institutional framework of intrajurisdictional political markets.
                                                
21 The majority of these problems are well known in the economic literature on innovation and diffusion
of new products and technologies.
22 For those compatibility problems see, for example, Heine/Kerber (2002) in regard to the introduction of
regulatory competition of corporate laws within the EU after the "Centros"-decision of the European Court
of Justice.
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(3) This leads to the general incentive problem in regard to innovation and imitation of
substantive and procedural legal rules, theories, and practices in the case of competition policy.
23
There can be doubts whether the already mentioned yardstick competition, which is driven by
intrajurisdictional political competition,
24 is strong enough for providing sufficient incentives for
politicians. Nevertheless, within competition law regimes, there are also other agents who can
influence innovation and imitation. Economists and legal scholars, who influence the academic
discussion on competition policy, might have large incentives for the innovation of new theories
and arguments, and/or for importing them into domestic academic discussions. Officials in
competition authorities and high judges in courts, who are responsible for drawing up guidelines
and/or deciding on specific cases (including precedence), as well as lawyers might have specific
incentives for picking up new theories and developing new arguments. Therefore, complex
incentive and transmission mechanisms are at work in this type (I)-competition of competition
laws, which need to be analysed in detail.
25
1.5 Conclusions
We have seen that one important interpretation of "competition of competition laws" is that the
parallel existence of different competition policies in different countries can be viewed as a
process of parallel experimentation, which allows for innovation and mutual learning from the
experiences of other countries. This effect was isolated in the analysis of type (I)-competition of
competition laws. Its rationale lies in the fundamental knowledge problem that we cannot assume
that the best way to protect competition is already found, and that from an Hayekian (and also
Schumpeterian) perspective competition of competition laws can be understood as a "discovery
procedure" (or "innovation-imitation"-process) which might lead to a process of improving the
quality of competition laws. Learning can take place both horizontally between the competition
law regimes on the same jurisdictional level and vertically between different jurisdictional levels.
Although type (I)-competition of competition laws does not work without institutional
preconditions that have to be analysed in more depth, it is important that no mechanisms can be
described that lead to systematic processes of deterioration, in contrast to the following types of
competition of competition laws. We contend rather that, in the long run, considerable beneficial
effects of experimentation and learning on the quality of competition law regimes can be
expected. The most important precondition, however, is the maintenance of a certain degree of
decentralisation and diversity, leading to a powerful argument against centralisation and
harmonisation of competition laws in the international setting.
                                                
23 Please note that this type (I)-regulatory competition does not comprise any direct incentives in regard to
the jurisdictions, since effects of competition laws concerning international trade or migration of firms and
production factors are excluded from the analysis.
24 However, yardstick competition requires that voters have incentives to get familiar with foreign policies
and their performance in other countries.
25 See Kovacic (1992, 1996) on the different channels through which innovations spread into and within
the U.S. antitrust system.
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2. Type (II)-Competition of Competition Laws: International Trade
2.1 Introduction
We now want to extend the analysis by additionally allowing for the mobility of goods. Factors
of production are still assumed to be immobile and there is also no direct choice of law. These
mobility assumptions imply that type (II)-competition of competition laws embraces type (I)
(yardstick competition), i.e., that processes of experimentation and mutual learning are effective
here as well. However, international trade between jurisdictions offers an additional transmission
mechanism through which competition of competition laws can become effective. It primarily
works through the effects of domestic competition policies on the competitiveness of domestic
firms on international markets (in relation to foreign firms), influencing the relationship of
exports and imports. The enhancement of the international competitiveness of domestic firms by
an appropriate competition policy has always been a popular argument in competition policy
discussions, e.g. regarding merger policy or cartel exemptions.
26
2.2 Improving the Protection of Competition
2.2.1 Increasing the International Competitiveness of Domestic Firms by Strict Competition
Laws
One strategy to increase the international competitiveness of domestic firms can consist of a
consequent policy against every kind of market power. It is the goal of such competition policies
to increase the intensity of competition on domestic markets and to prevent firms from getting
powerful market positions, which allow them to rest on their past successes. The rationale for this
strategy is that highly competitive domestic markets increase the competitiveness of domestic
firms and render them fitter for international competition than foreign firms who are used to less
competitive market conditions. Therefore, competition laws leading to a high level of protection
of competition can increase the international competitiveness of domestic firms.
27 Moreover,
such policies may lead to cost reductions on the markets for intermediate goods, leading to
competitive advantages for domestic firms compared to foreign ones with non-competitive (and,
therefore, more inefficient) suppliers of intermediate goods.
28
2.2.2 Protection of Consumers on International Markets
Another incentive from international trade for competition-increasing policies has to be
considered concerning jurisdictions in which there are only few producers and which, therefore,
focus predominantly on consumers' benefits. Since such a jurisdiction would have to bear the
costs of monopolisation in international markets (many consumers) without participating much in
                                                
26 See among many others Neumann (1990), Kantzenbach/Kinne (1997), European Commission (2002,
pp. 100-119), and especially regarding innovative industries Fuchs (1989) and Jorde/Teece (1992).
27 This line of thought has always been emphasized in the ordoliberal tradition of competition theory and
policy in Germany (and its rejection of industrial policy). See e.g. Immenga (1999). This argument is also
stressed by Porter’s (1990) "competitive advantage of nations".
28 The same argumentation may be applied to factor markets. For instance, competitive capital markets
and banking systems allow for lower interests rates, whereas highly-regulated labor markets with many
rigidities can increase labor costs.
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the profits (only few producers), this jurisdiction has incentives to run a high level of protection
of competition as well as to try to impose it also on international markets.
29
2.2.3 Rationale for Improving the Protection of Competition
If jurisdictions with a high level of protection of competition systematically (a) increase the
competitiveness of their domestic firms in international markets or (b) protect their domestic
consumers from market power, these policies will probably be reinforced through
intrajurisdictional political competition, since (a) both export-oriented and import-substituting
firms (including their employees) or (b) the dominating group of consumers benefits. Citizens in
jurisdictions with less consequent competition policies will experience negative feedback from
international trade, because their export-oriented firms suffer from low international
competitiveness and their import-substituting industries are strongly challenged by foreign
competitors (a), or their consumers finance foreign monopoly rents by bearing higher prices (b).
This can provide political-economic incentives for politicians to adjust their competition policy
regime towards more competition. In this case, it can be presumed that type (II)-competition of
competition laws leads to an improvement of competition laws. The parallel existence of type (I)-
competition of competition laws further supports this mechanism. Since legal innovations (or
imitations) in regard to substantial or procedural competition rules, theories, or practices improve
the protection of competition and / or imply lower enforcement costs both for competition
authorities and firms, the international trade mechanism reinforces the incentives for type (I)-
competition of competition laws.
30
2.3 Strategic Competition Policy: Deliberate Toleration of Market Power and 
Anticompetitive Behaviour
However, there also exist theories implying that the deliberate toleration of market power and the
lessening of (domestic) competition can increase the international competitiveness of domestic
firms and, thereby, contribute to domestic welfare. In analogy to the well-known strategic trade
policies, which use tariffs, subsidies, and other protectionist trade policy instruments to increase
domestic welfare, we can call such approaches “strategic competition policies”.
31
2.3.1 Strategic Competition Policy I: Domestic Market Power and Efficiencies on
International Markets
A jurisdiction can strategically allow their enterprises to obtain market power in domestic
markets, if there are efficiency gains concerning their activities in related international markets
                                                
29 See similarly Guzman (1998).
30 The same level of protection of competition can be carried out more efficiently by one jurisdiction than
by others (e.g. through transparency in filing requirements, tighter time schedules, or more effective
leniency programs). Therefore, firms in jurisdictions with more efficient procedural rules will have to bear
lower costs, implying  a competitive advantage on international markets.
31 See on strategic trade theory e.g. Helpman/Krugman (1985) and Kemp (2001), and concerning the
relation to competition policies Klodt (1993), Greaney (1999), and Markl/Meissner (2000).
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due to synergies and economies of scale and scope.
32 Since international markets usually are
larger than national ones, the efficient size of firms on international markets may be larger. Thus,
cooperation between domestic enterprises and a higher domestic concentration may be efficient.
This can be called an ‘international competitiveness defence’, referring to a trade-off between
market power effects (allocative inefficiencies) on domestic markets and efficiency effects on
international markets. A recent example can be seen in the merger of E.ON and Ruhrgas that
tends to create a near-monopolistic position on the German gas market and, therefore, has
initially been prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office). However, the
German Federal Ministry of Economics overruled the Bundeskartellamt and allowed the merger
because it "strengthens the international competitiveness of Ruhrgas on international gas markets
(…)."
33 The Ministry did not deny the emergence of market power on the domestic market but
since it assumed that the gas markets are on their way to internationalise, it concluded efficiency
advantages for the merged company concerning these emerging larger international markets.
34
2.3.2 Strategic Competition Policy II: Market Power on International Markets
The deliberate toleration of market power by domestic competition policies can also serve to
support the attainment of market power on international markets by domestic firms. In this case,
profits do not result from efficiency gains, but from monopoly or oligopoly rents on international
markets. Therefore, the benefits for the domestic firms (and their employees) are based on higher
prices, predominantly for foreign consumers, and the deterrence of (actual and potential) foreign
competitors. Thus, this represents some kind of a beggar-my-neighbour-strategy because it
implies a rent-shifting process from foreign to domestic agents. Well-known competition policy
strategies in this area include the exemption of export cartels, selective non-enforcement of
competition laws, the strategic use of merger control to support the creation of ‘national
champions’ and ‘domestic global players’ as well as the promotion of R&D-cooperations (e.g.
strategic alliances) directed to international markets (promotion of  ‘key industries’ and ‘future
trend-setting technologies’). For instance, in the well-known US-EU dispute on the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger (1996/97), both sides have been accused to abuse competition law
for strategic industrial goals: the US was said to support the creation of an US monopoly on the
world market for large civil jet aircrafts with more than 100 passengers by allowing the merger
without considerable modifications, whereas the European Commission was said to protect
Airbus against a more efficient competitor by challenging the merger.
35
                                                
32 This applies predominantly to markets that are internationalising, i.e. that they used to be national but
are in the process of becoming international ones. Not included in this case is cross-subsidizing (see infra
case c).
33 Alfred Tacke, Administrative State Secretary in the German Federal Ministry of Economics , in the
Financial Times Deutschland Online, (Sept 19, 2002), http://www.ftd.de/ub/di/1032245712795.html?nv=s
(our translation).
34 It has to be remarked, however, that the German Monopolies Commission (2002a, 2002b) explicitly
rejected this line of argument and, instead, supported the decision of the Bundeskartellamt. Thus, this
might turn out to be an example for the infra case b).
35 See Fox (1998b) and Budzinski/Kerber (2003, pp. 17-19, 93-96). Market shares before the merger were:
Boeing more than 60%, Airbus 30%, MDD less than 10%. Eventually, the merger was approved,
nevertheless with modifications concerning exclusive long-term contracts of Boeing and MDD with
several US-airlines.
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This latter example shows that deliberately allowing for market power can also be directed
against foreign firms that intend to export their goods into the domestic markets. For example, a
jurisdiction can protect import-substituting industries against their foreign competitors by
enabling them to erect barriers to entry. Instruments include the permission of a defence
concentration or of vertical integration that might exclude imports from domestic distribution
channels.
36
2.3.3 Strategic Competition Policy III: Domestic Market Power and Predatory Behaviour
on International Markets
Domestic competition policy can allow some firms to reap profits from domestic market power
and use them to cross-subsidize foreign market activities. A strategy to promote a "national
global player" may be to grant monopoly privileges on purely national or regional markets
allowing the privileged firm to use the monopoly rents to finance predatory strategies on
international markets and harm its foreign competitors.
The recent controversy about the behaviour of the Deutsche Post AG might serve as an example.
Deutsche Post has a monopoly privilege for postal services in Germany concerning standard
letters. This remnant from the former governmental organised German mail market is under
pressure from liberalisation claims by the European Commission, but the German Government so
far refused to withdraw the monopoly privilege. During the last years, the Deutsche Post has
started an expansive strategy on the international logistic markets, including takeovers of Global
Mail (U.S., 1998), Danzas (CH, 1999), Air Express International (U.S., 1999), and DHL (step-
by-step 1998-2002). Since the postage for standard letters remained significantly higher than in
other European countries and, at the same time, the prices of Deutsche Post and its subsidiaries in
the international logistic markets were reduced considerably, complaints about cross-
subsidization were raised by competitors and the European Court of First Instance leading to
several investigations by the European competition authorities.
37
Export promotion through dumping strategies represents an interface between trade and
competition policy. On the international level, an anti-dumping policy regime, implemented
within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), addresses all kinds of dumping
strategies that are made possible and supported by public authorities.
38 However, controversial
opinions exist, whether the WTO rules include dumping strategies of private firms that are based
on loose competition policies in their home countries.
39 Altogether, the role of the WTO remains
rather limited concerning such cases.
                                                
36 Several cases in which the U.S., the EU or Japan have acted along these lines are discussed in Fox
(2003) and Stephan (2003).
37 Cases IP/00/562 abuse of dominant position: disturbance of international mail traffic, IP/00/919 abuse
of dominant position: predatory pricing in mail-order parcel delivery service, and IP/99/530 state aid.
Only the state aid investigation led to a fine, so far, but Deutsche Post has filed an appeal.
38 Currently, there is a vital discussion on dumping through low labour and environmental standards,
especially in developing countries. This issue is not discussed here.
39 See Hoekman/Mavroidis (1994), Iacobucci (1997), Hoekman (1997), Fox (1999), and Janow (2000).
The standard example is the Kodak/Fuji-Film-case in which the US tried in vain to stop (indirectly)
government-supported anticompetitive private practices in Japan.
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2.3.4 Purely Domestic Case: Market Power without Effects on International Trade
Competition policy can also tolerate market power on domestic markets without directly
affecting international trade. If competition policy "only" results in rent-shifting between
domestic agents, e.g. from domestic consumers to domestic firms, negative welfare effects for the
domestic economy might ensue. However, as long as these effects do not affect other
jurisdictions, this case is irrelevant for type (II)-competition of competition policies.
2.3.5 Rationale for Strategic Competition Policy
In the first case (a), the favoured firms and their employees benefit and will lobby for a
reinforcement of this kind of competition policy through the process of intrajurisdictional
political competition. Since there are efficiency gains in international markets, consumers might
benefit from decreasing prices (at least in the long run). Disadvantages, however, may result for
remaining domestic competitors of the new global player and also for consumers in the
monopolised domestic market. From a traditional welfare perspective, this strategy (a),
nonetheless, might be Kaldor-Hicks-superior, if the losers were compensated by the winners.
40
However, this is only true, if the efficiency gains (scale- and scope-effects) become in fact
realised, which often is not the case. Moreover, from a political-economic perspective, the losers
(most likely small firms and domestic consumers) would probably not possess enough lobby
power to prevent this strategy.
In contrast to the first case (a), the strategic competition policies (b) and (c) do not produce an
efficiency-based gain for the world economy. Instead, international competition is harmed by the
national competition policies and international allocation becomes inefficient. As analysed, for
example, by the Virginia School of Antitrust Analysis
41, antitrust policy as well as any other
policy field can become captured by lobbyism and interest groups. Strategic competition policies
(b) and (c) become political-economically rational, if the agents that benefit are better organised
to lobby than the losers.
42 Both export-oriented and import-substituting industries, which have
incentives to lobby for a strategic abuse of competition policy, have relatively low organisational
costs and are represented by well-organised industry associations. Just as well, the "national
champions" and their stakeholders (e.g. unions of their employees) should be big enough
themselves to participate successfully in the lobbyism game. On the other side, the losers
predominantly consist of groups with high organisational costs (consumers) or will live abroad
and have no voice in the domestic political competition. Thus, it can be political-economically
rational to perform strategies (b) and (c), even if they lead to a net welfare decrease within the
domestic jurisdiction.
Moreover, modern trade theory shows that under certain assumptions the national welfare gains
from strategic restrictions / distortions of international competition may be high enough to
compensate the domestic losers – at least as long as the foreign jurisdictions do not engage in
                                                
40 Originally, the Kaldor-Hicks-criterion requires that (at least theoretically) all losers, domestic and
foreign ones, can be compensated.
41 See Shughart/Tollison (1985) and McChesney/Shughart (1995).
42 See Olson (1965).
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such strategies themselves.
43 Thus, politicians may have incentives from intrajurisdictional
political competition to direct domestic competition policy to alleged "national" (but in fact
partial) interests.
44 Internationally discriminating competition policy strategies can, eventually,
become a profit-maximizing strategy for one country, but not for the world economy: if all
jurisdictions carry out these types of discriminating strategies all countries have to cope with a
reduced welfare compared to the free-trade-and-no-discrimination equilibrium. Nevertheless,
jurisdictions might choose such "beggar-my-neighbour" competition policy strategies although
they reduce the level of world welfare. The rationale of this process is provided by economic
game theory. In game-theoretic terms, a prisoners’ dilemma emerges. For each jurisdiction, it
remains individually rational to choose the beggar-my-neighbour strategy as long as it designs its
competition policy autonomously, i.e. without suprajurisdictional arrangements. In the absence of
international coordination, the overall performance of strategic competition policies represents a
stable Nash-equilibrium and the superior equilibrium
45 is not attained. From this perspective, a
jurisdiction that chooses a procompetitive strategy while all other jurisdictions use strategic
competition policies (b) and (c), will bear the costs of these beggar-my-neighbour strategies, and,
thus, would receive incentives through this type (II)-competition of competition laws to adapt
their competition policy.
46 This could lead to a defection race implying a deterioration of
protection of competition. An analogous argument, the tendency towards subsidy races, is well-
known and largely accepted in the literature on strategic trade policy.
47
The cases discussed in this section show that if strategic competition policies dominate type (II)-
competition of competition laws, a systematic deterioration of competition laws and policies with
a declining protection of competition can result. This process might be reinforced by type (I)-
regulatory competition because, under these conditions, mutual learning can also include learning
about more effective beggar-my-neighbour-strategies.
2.4 Problems and Relevance
As type (II)-competition of competition laws relies on an indirect transmission mechanism, an
analysis how relevant the effects of international trade are for the evolution of competition laws is
required:
(1) The role of the effects doctrine: The effects doctrine is of crucial importance for the ability of
jurisdictions to perform those strategic competition policies. A complete application of the effects
                                                
43 However, there remains a net welfare loss, but this loss is completely imposed on the foreign
jurisdiction. See for overviews Helpman/Krugman (1985), Krugman (1987), Guzman (1998), Kemp
(2001), and Kemp/Shimomura (2002).
44 See on the connection of protectionist interests, intrajurisdictional competition and international trade
Vanberg (2000), who concludes that without factor mobility and without choice of law protectionist and
rent-seeking interests have a good chance to influence national policy strategies.
45 All jurisdictions fight market power and make exemptions only on the grounds of efficiencies for the
world economy.
46 Please note that this also depends on the theories that dominate competition policy. If it is true that
intensive domestic competition enhances the competitiveness of domestic firms, as it was assumed in
section III.2.2, a procompetitive strategy need not lead to negative effects on international trade despite
strategic competition policies of other jurisdictions.
47 See among many others Klodt (1993) and Markl/Meissner (2000).
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doctrine would render any strategic competition policy impossible. Whenever national
competition authorities would allow a foreign-market-oriented cartel or merger, the negatively
affected jurisdiction would intervene to prevent the anticompetitive effects. Therefore, a perfectly
enforced effects doctrine would exclude those strategic competition policies with beggar-my-
neighbour-effects from competition of competition laws.
48 Consequently, the effects doctrine
represents an institutional arrangement that reduces the range of strategies that can be chosen by
jurisdictions in type (II)-competition of competition laws. In reality, however, the effects doctrine
cannot be applied in a perfect and complete way. Shortcomings like problems of investigation,
information-gathering and rule-enforcement abroad as well as its potential to generate
jurisdictional conflicts
49 clearly demonstrate this. Therefore, despite the existence of the effects
doctrine, strategic competition policies may be impeded but not eliminated in a real-world
setting.
50
(2) Relevance: It is difficult to estimate the importance of type (II)-competition of competition
laws. One has to consider that the importance of international trade and export-import-relations
differ considerably among jurisdictions (from small open countries with a high significance of
international trade to large countries dominated by domestic markets). Often, the international
competitiveness of domestic firms has only a small importance for intrajurisdictional political
competition which is dominated by other issues.
(3) Trade policy versus competition policy: If a jurisdiction’s performance in international trade is
important enough for its citizens to set incentives via domestic political competition, political
influence on export-import-relations might be more efficiently directed to the use of trade policy
instruments than to competition policy instruments. However, due to the development of an
international free trade framework under the governance of the WTO, trade policy competencies
have been delegated (although incompletely) to an international level and the national authorities
have become restricted in the application of trade policy instruments – and this process probably
will continue. This might create a ‘vacuum’ that can be filled by replacing strategic trade policy
by strategic competition policy as a second-best-solution.
51
                                                
48 Of course, the procompetitive strategy remains possible as well as an efficiency-oriented competition
policy tolerating purely domestic market power.
49 Examples include the US-EU-conflicts on Boeing/MDD and GE/Honeywell. See additionally the
impressive listing by Klodt (2001) of jurisdictional conflicts caused by the effects doctrine. Another
important disadvantage of the effects doctrine is the increase in transaction costs of international mergers
that must comply with a number of national and supranational merger controls with different and
sometimes contradictory requirements.
50 Moreover, the effects doctrine itself can be used as an instrument of strategic competition policy. It can
be strategically applied to handicap foreign competitors of domestic firms. There are considerable
asymmetries concerning the jurisdictional power to enforce the domestic competition laws against the
resistance of another jurisdiction. Whereas big jurisdictions with important markets (like the U.S. and the
EU) can easily protect domestic competition against restrictions from abroad, small and developing
countries often have difficulties in doing so. Therefore, the power asymmetries between the jurisdictions
offer the possibility for powerful jurisdictions to abuse the effects doctrine to serve protectionist interests.
See Jacquemin (1995) and Fox (1998a, 1998b, 2000).
51 See Cadot/Grether/De Melo (2000) and Budzinski (2002a). An example provides the Kodak/Fuji-Film
case, in which Japan was accused of maintaining its protection of domestic markets against foreign firms
by tolerating an import cartel after the original, trade policy based protection had to be reduced (due to
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2.5 Conclusions
Type (II)-competition of competition laws is an indirect competition with limited importance but
not without considerable effectiveness. However, theoretically, it remains unclear whether type
(II)-regulatory competition improves competition laws (like in the competitive-advantage-
through-domestic-competition case) or leads into prisoners’ dilemmas with sub-optimal
competition laws due to the dominance of strategic competition policies (implying a deterioration
of the protection of competition). The institutional arrangements that restrict the capability of
jurisdictions to pursue market power tolerating strategic competition policies have an important
influence on the outcome of the respective regulatory competition process. The effects doctrine,
for instance, reduces the scope for those strategic competition policies, but leads simultaneously
also to a limitation of type (II)-competition of competition laws in general. The application of
other rules than the effects doctrine would lead to different effects. Designing them properly
might allow to benefit from the advantages of these competition processes without having to
suffer from their potential defects. Type (II)-competition of competition laws can only work
horizontally between competition laws on the same jurisdictional level, whereas vertical
regulatory competition is not possible.
52
3. Type (III)-Competition of Competition Laws: via Interjurisdictional Competition
3.1 Introduction
In this section, in addition to the mobility of information and goods, the mobility of factors of
production, namely capital and labour, is assumed. Thus, enterprises and individuals may choose
indirectly between different institutional arrangements via the choice of their location. However,
direct choice of law independent from the (physical) location is still excluded from the analysis.
The specific transmission mechanism of type (III)-competition of competition laws is the inflow
and outflow of production factors due to different competition laws and policies. The idea is that
an inflow of production factors contributes to increasing national welfare whereas a significant
exit of factors decreases the domestic welfare. Therefore, politicians have incentives to adjust
their regulations in order to attract instead of driving away mobile factors: jurisdictions compete
for mobile factors, especially for firms.
Most of the existing literature on competition of competition laws draws exclusively or
predominantly on interjurisdictional competition (type (III)-competition).
53 The focus is on the
effects of different competition laws on the locational choice of enterprises and the strategic use
of competition laws to attract business. In contrast to type (II), type (III)-regulatory competition
is focused on the international competitiveness of jurisdictions instead of firms.
                                                                                                                                                             
WTO requirements). Thus, Japan simply “privatized protection” by selective non-enforcement of
competition laws to compensate the loss of trade policy instruments. See Fox (2003, p. 23).
52 Vertical regulatory competition is not effective, because exports and imports of goods are based on
territories and vertically-related jurisdictions share the same territory (with higher-level jurisdictions
usually having a larger one that includes the lower-level territory).
53 See e.g. Easterbrook (1983), Nicolaides (1992, 1994), Freytag/Zimmermann (1998), Fox (2000),
Meessen (2000), and Sinn (2003). Since none of the existing literature distinguishes between the different
types of competition of competition laws, the focus on type (III)-regulatory competition is implicit.
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3.2 Improving the Protection of Competition
Domestic competition laws that foster competitive markets can serve as an attractor for firms and
investments. In analogy to the strategy for improving the protection of competition in type (II)-
regulatory competition, it can be argued that if highly competitive domestic markets improve the
competitiveness of the firms located within this jurisdiction
54; it is a rational strategy for these
firms to choose this location. The deliberate choice of a location within a jurisdiction with strict
competition laws can also be interpreted as some kind of self-commitment to remain competitive,
which might generate positive signals to investors, shareholders, competitors, and consumers.
Additionally, lower prices for intermediate goods, which can be expected if strict competition
laws secure intensive competition on these markets, can be an argument for choosing this
jurisdiction.
Some authors conclude that if improved competition policies attract more factors, then
interjurisdictional competition will lead to an improvement of competition laws (race to the
top).
55 Since mobile factors will locate themselves within the jurisdiction that supplies the best
competition laws, jurisdictions with inferior institutions will experience actual exits and threats to
exit by mobile factors. This provides incentives for politicians to adjust their competition laws
according to the superior solutions. In this case, again, the parallel existence of type (I)-
competition of competition laws supports this mechanism. Reciprocally, interjurisdictional
competition provides additional incentives for the innovation and imitation of substantial and
procedural competition rules, theories, or practices in order to improve the competition law
regimes.
3.3 Deliberate Toleration of Market Power and Anticompetitive Behaviour
On the other hand, competition laws that deliberately allow for domestic market power and
anticompetitive business behaviour may also be attractive for firms. If firms value the freedom to
cartelise and monopolise higher than the protection against those modes of behaviour if
performed by their competitors, the strategy to lower the level of protection of competition can
improve the competitiveness of jurisdictions in the international market for locations.
56 In that
respect, strategic competition policies can also be relevant in interjurisdictional competition.
Generally, the same cases can be differentiated like in section III.2.
Domestic market power and efficiencies on international markets (strategic competition policy I):
Jurisdictions can attempt to attract firms by offering competition policies, which allow the
reaping of efficiency gains, e.g. by introducing an efficiency defence in merger control, although
market power on (related) domestic markets might ensue. Since economies of scale-effects can
increase the international competitiveness, firms might prefer this kind of competition policy,
leading to an inflow of firms and capital into this jurisdiction.
Market power on international markets (strategic competition policy II): A lower level of
protection of competition, either by less strict competition laws or a policy of (selective) non-
                                                
54 See again Porter (1990).
55 See e.g. Meessen (1989, 2000), Hauser/Schöne (1994), De Léon (1997), Freytag/Zimmermann (1998),
and First (1998).
56 For example by running a cartel haven, granting monopoly privileges or selective non-enforcement of
domestic competition rules; see Fox (2000), pp. 1795-1797.
21 Kerber and Budzinski: Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competit
Produced by bepress.com, 201122
enforcement, can be an important argument for locational decisions, if firms want to restrict
competition by cartels, build up market power by mergers, or perform anticompetitive behaviour
on international markets. If the negative effects of market power and anticompetitive behaviour
primarily affect markets in other jurisdictions, the positive welfare effects of the inflow of
resources can overcompensate possible negative effects on domestic markets due to a lower level
of protection of competition.
Domestic market power and predatory behaviour on international markets (strategic competition
policy III): Also the strategy to allow firms to build up market power on domestic markets in
order to use these profits to cross-subsidize business activities on foreign markets (maybe to
finance predatory strategies), can be attractive for firms in regard to their locational decision.
Purely domestic case: market power without effects on international trade: A jurisdiction can
allow for market power that can only be used to reap profits from domestic markets. It may be
attractive for firms to move their location into that jurisdiction, even if they produce exclusively
for its domestic market. Under certain conditions, it might be an attractive strategy for
jurisdictions, particularly if otherwise domestic suppliers are unable to produce these goods, e.g.
due to lacking technology and knowledge.
By emphasising the success of deliberately allowing market power as a strategy in
interjurisdictional competition, some contributors to the literature on competition of competition
laws fear a race-to-the-bottom of antitrust standards.
57 This includes also the purely domestic
case.
58 If firms prefer jurisdictions with a low level of protection of competition, which allow for
anticompetitive behaviour and the building up of market power, jurisdictions with a high level of
protection of competition might suffer from an exit of factors and a subsequent decrease in
welfare. Consequently, agents in those jurisdictions have incentives to vote in favour of a policy
imitating the successful jurisdictions in order to re-attract mobile factors. Thus, stiff
interjurisdictional competition can lead to a deterioration of competition laws. Similar to type
(II)-competition of competition laws, prisoners’ dilemma situations can appear. Although all
jurisdictions could be better off with appropriate competition laws, there can be a sub-optimal
equilibrium with an insufficient level of protection of competition.
3.4 Relevance and Problems
Although locational competition represents a more direct type of competition of competition laws
there are also some obstacles for the workability of this type of regulatory competition.
Therefore, the effectiveness of type (III)-competition of competition laws has to be scrutinized:
(1) It is a specific characteristic of type (III)-competition of competition laws that firms cannot
choose only a more attractive competition law by moving to another jurisdiction but have to
accept the entire bundle of public goods, regulations and taxes of this jurisdiction. It is doubtful
                                                
57 See Sinn (1990), Ackermann (1998), and, with a more critical attitude, Van den Bergh/Camesasca
(2001, pp. 133, 149-154). Sinn (2003) derives a race-to-the-bottom (with, however, conflicting welfare
effects) in a game-theoretic general equilibrium model of competition of competition policies.
58 Although "the purely domestic case" does not affect competition on international markets, it might
nonetheless lead to a deterioration of competition laws because jurisdictions can try to attract firms by
lowering their antitrust standards. Thus, in contrast to type (II)-purely domestic case, its type (III)
analogue may lead to a defective competition of competition laws.
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whether competition laws will dominate locational decisions in the face of the importance of
other jurisdictional characteristics (e.g. taxes, labour market regulations, etc.).
(2) There might be considerable costs of mobility, which have to be overcompensated by the
benefits of the locational change.
(3) Another limiting factor to type (III)-competition of competition laws is represented by the
effects doctrine. Under a perfect effects doctrine-regime, moving the location of a firm to another
jurisdiction with a lower protection of competition does not help because the jurisdictions of the
affected markets will nevertheless enforce their (stricter) competition laws against
anticompetitive behaviour of the firm.
59 Again, no scope for type (III)-competition of competition
laws would remain.
60 However, since the effects doctrine cannot be applied perfectly, some scope
probably remains for type (III)-competition of competition laws.
3.5 Conclusions
Type (III)-competition of competition laws opens up the possibility for firms to choose between
different competition law regimes by physically moving between jurisdictions. Thereby, it might
enhance the effectiveness of regulatory competition and improve competition laws. Such
beneficial effects are to be expected if firms prefer a more competitive domestic market because
of its beneficial effects on their competitiveness and on downstream markets (race-to-the-top).
Nevertheless, race-to-the-bottom processes can emerge if jurisdictions engage in strategic
competition policies that allow for restrictive practices and the building up of market power in
domestic and international markets. In these cases, type (III)-competition of competition laws can
run into prisoners’ dilemma problems on the international level, which cannot be solved without
international coordination. Whether prisoners’ dilemma problems result or type (III)-competition
of competition laws proves to be beneficial, largely depends on the institutional framework of
that regulatory competition, i.e. on the rules that shape the jurisdictions’ behaviour in
interjurisdictional competition. Again, the effects doctrine can play an important limiting role but
also other rules such as comity-principles could be an important part of an institutional
framework that allows for productive interjurisdictional competition and rules out race-to-the-
bottom phenomena. Similar to type (II), type (III)-competition of competition laws can only be
applied to horizontal competition between jurisdictions on the same jurisdictional level, whereas
vertical competition is excluded.
4. Type (IV)-Competition of Competition Laws: via Choice of Law
Type (IV)-regulatory competition implies that firms have the right to choose directly between
regulations of different jurisdictions without having to move their location to that jurisdiction.
The well-known case of competition among U.S. corporate laws represents a striking example for
this type of regulatory competition, but can it also be applied to competition law?
                                                
59 As Eleanor Fox (2000, p. 1795) puts it: “There is no escape from antitrust.” See also Meessen (2000, p.
11), who emphasises that antitrust laws do not depend on the location of business but on the affected
markets.
60 The effects doctrine represents no problem for the "purely domestic case" because the lower level of
protection of competition affects only the domestic markets.
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The application would imply that firms are allowed to choose between the competition laws of
different jurisdictions without changing their location or the geographically relevant markets of
their business. Of course, firms would be interested in choosing between different competition
law regimes. Examples exist, which highlight that firms might have this choice to a limited
extent. In Europe, for example, firms can influence by the specific design of their mergers or
cooperative agreements, which competition rules are relevant for their cases. Since e.g. European
merger control was viewed as less restrictive as German merger control, there was an incentive to
specify mergers in a way (via turnover thresholds) that they fall under the jurisdiction of
European merger control. Such kinds of "forum shopping" between national and European
competition rules also existed in regard to cartel exemptions but only in a limited way.
61
However, forum shopping is also viewed as one of the potential problems of the decentralisation
approach of the European Commission concerning the reform of the application of Art. 81 and 82
EC Treaty.
62 On the international level, the situation is completely different. The "effects
doctrine" largely excludes forum shopping and, instead, leads to the contrary effect, namely the
cumulating of competition law proceedings that deal with one and the same case. Yet, the
practical limits to the enforcement of the "effects doctrine" might give scope for forum shopping
in specific cases. However, all of these examples of forum shopping are not intended from the
perspective of competition policy and nearly always assessed negatively in the literature.
63
How should one assess a type (IV)-competition of competition laws? The aim of competition law
is the protection of competition on markets, i.e. the regulation refers to a particular market and
not to a particular firm. If we let the firms on a market choose under which competition rules they
want to do business, a prisoners’ dilemma emerges. Individually, each firm is interested in being
not restricted in its business practices on the market, leading to the choice of less restrictive or
poorly enforced competition laws. Although the firms might be interested in being protected from
anticompetitive behaviour of others and, therefore, might prefer a stricter competition law, the
prisoners’ dilemma situation can lead to a process, in which jurisdictions (in order to induce firms
to choose their competition law
64) change their  laws to less stricter ones. Consequently, a race to
the bottom-process might ensue, leading to a defective competition of competition laws. From
this perspective, the idea that choice of law can be applied to competition law seems to be
entirely mistaken and even absurd from the beginning.
65
                                                
61 See for example Van den Bergh/Camesasca (2001, pp. 151-152). Consequently, the German
competition policy felt the pressure to adapt their standards to the less restrictive ones of the European
competition policy.
62 See e.g. German Monopolies Commission (1999, 2001), Mavroidis/Neven (2000), and
Bourgeois/Humpe (2002). However, in this case, the choice is not between laws but between different
enforcement agencies.
63 This is even true for some ardent proponents of regulatory competition in antitrust, e.g. Stephan (2000,
pp. 186-187, problem of "jurisdiction-shopping").
64 However, in this case, an incentive must exist for the jurisdictions, e.g. a kind of franchise tax like in
U.S. corporate laws.
65 Another argumentation with the same result would begin by interpreting competition on a particular
market as a public good, which only can be produced, if all firms on this market contribute to the
production of this public good by subjecting themselves to the same restrictive rules. Stephan (2000, pp.
186-187, 199) argues that antitrust law concerns itself with injuries to third parties that are not involved in
the competition-violating arrangement (e.g. consumers harmed by a cartel). No contractual link between
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Is it possible to find any cases at all, in which a type (IV)-competition of competition laws might
lead to improvements of competition law regimes? Two cases can be distinguished:
(1) Efficiency of procedures: Choosing between different competition law regimes by firms can
help to improve competition laws, if this choice does not depend on the strictness of protection of
competition but on the efficiency of competition law procedures. For example, merger reviews of
different competition law regimes might cause different costs and require different time for the
merging firms - independent from the strictness of the review. If the same level of protection of
competition would be ensured by other means (e.g. international arrangements), a free choice of
the competition law regime in case of a merger review might lead to a productive competition
between the competition authorities in regard to the costs of merger reviews, both for the firms
and the jurisdictions.
(2) Rent-seeking problems and over-regulation: The basic problem of type (IV)-competition of
competition laws can also be described in the way that choice of competition laws enables firms
to circumvent strict competition laws by choosing more lenient ones. Nevertheless,
circumvention of inefficient laws can also enhance the welfare of a society. If, for example,
competition laws are discriminating between different industries due to rent-seeking-activities or
are generally too restrictive and, therefore, stifling competition and impeding efficiency (over-
regulation), type (IV)-competition of competition laws might lead to an improvement of
competition laws because the circumvention might induce the jurisdictions to enact more
appropriate competition laws.
66 However, type (IV)-competition of competition laws misses a
device which stops the deregulation race at the optimal level and, thus, prevents the process from
turning into a deficient race-to-the-bottom.
In general, type (IV)-regulatory competition is not applicable to competition law because
competition law refers to the protection of competition on a particular market. Allowing
competing firms on a market to choose individually between different competition laws will lead
to a break down of the protection of competition. Only in very particular cases, like in the case of
over-regulation and in regard to the efficiency of procedures, type (IV)-competition of
competition laws might offer limited scope for an improvement of competition laws. Altogether,
the example of competition of U.S. corporate laws cannot serve as a model for competition of
competition laws.
67 Instead, the wide-spread suspicion against forum shopping concerning
competition rules is justified.
                                                                                                                                                             
anticompetitive firms and harmed consumers/competitors exists. Instead, significant externalities occur
because of the resulting jurisdiction-shopping and there is no workable mechanism that would force the
law-choosing firms to internalise these costs.
66 This could also be relevant for type (III)-competition of competition laws, if firms (by migration) chose
lenient competition laws to escape from over-regulation. In the general theories of interjurisdictional and
regulatory competition, it has been emphasised that these competition processes can limit the scope of
welfare losses due to rent seeking activities, see Sinn (1992).
67 Stephan (2000) and Fox (2000) also stress this.
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5. A Brief Overall Assessment
Four basic types of "competition of competition laws" have been distinguished. They differ
considerably in regard to their preconditions, incentive structures, transmission mechanisms, and
overall results. Although we could not analyse all relevant cases in detail (and additional
differentiations are possible within these basic types), in this section, we attempt to give a brief
general assessment considering the feasibility of these types of "competition of competition
laws".
An important conclusion is that competition of competition laws constitutes a very different case
than the well-known example of competition of U.S. corporate laws. Firms should not be allowed
to choose their competition law for particular markets themselves. This is true both for direct
choice of law and for choosing their competition law by moving their location to another
jurisdiction. Competition laws cannot be separated from the markets on which they should
protect competition. Since competition laws necessarily have to restrict the behaviour of firms in
order to exclude anticompetitive practices, choosing between competition laws implies the
possibility of circumventing competition rules. Therefore, it can be expected that type (III)- and
type (IV)-competition of competition laws will generally lead to serious problems, namely a
deterioration of the protection of competition. However, there may be some exceptions from this
general assessment. Type (III)-competition of competition laws can also lead to improvements of
competition laws, if firms prefer strict competition laws.
68 Circumvention and the following
process of deregulation can be beneficial, if the current competition laws represent an over-
regulation (type (III) and type (IV)). If the level of protection of competition would be
safeguarded by other means, e.g. by the application of the effects doctrine, choosing between
different competition laws might improve the efficiency of procedures of competition law
regimes (type (III) and type (IV)). However, especially the last two cases probably represent
rather special cases with very limited practical significance.
Changing the perspective from the firms to the jurisdictions as the providers of competition laws
leads to the issue of strategic competition policies, which jurisdictions can use to enhance their
welfare or at least the welfare of powerful interest groups. Strategic competition policies are
particularly relevant concerning type (II)- and type (III)-competition of competition laws, in
which jurisdictions have incentives to instrumentalise competition policy in order to reap
advantages from international trade or interjurisdictional competition. Two main cases can be
distinguished:
(1) Both types of competition of competition laws can lead to an improvement of competition
laws, if theories dominate in intrajurisdictional political competition that a high level of
protection of competition enhances the international competitiveness of domestic firms (type (II))
or of jurisdictions as locations (type (III)).
(2) Jurisdictions can also engage in competition policy strategies, which reduce the protection of
competition in order to promote domestic firms on international markets (or protect them against
foreign competitors) or to attract firms in interjurisdictional competition. Generally, strategic
                                                
68 As it was shown in section III.3, the reasons are the positive effects of highly competitive markets either
on the competitiveness of the firms itself and / or on intermediate goods and factors. Both effects do not
exist in type (IV)-competition of competition laws because firms can only choose strict competition rules
for themselves but not for other firms on their own or related markets.
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competition policies have negative (external) effects on other jurisdictions and lead to prisoners’
dilemma-situations in regard to global welfare. Therefore, in most cases, competition of these
strategic competition policies must be assessed negatively because it tends to reduce the
protection of competition both on domestic and international markets.
Consequently, type (II) and (III)-competition of competition laws can improve competition laws
only if the negative effects of strategic competition policies are avoided by appropriate
institutional arrangements, like e.g. the effects doctrine or international rules. However, both will
limit considerably the extent of competition of competition policies. Altogether, the applicability
and extent of type (II), (III), and (IV)-competition of competition laws remains limited. They can
only be used in particular cases and have to be severely restricted, if a deterioration of the
protection of competition should be avoided.
The general assessment is different in regard to type (I)-competition of competition policies. If
the knowledge problem is taken seriously, i.e. that (a) the best competition laws are not known
yet and (b) permanently new adaptations are necessary due to economic and technological
change, processes of parallel experimentation become very important, leading to different
experiences and the possibility of mutual learning in regard to the effectiveness of substantial and
procedural rules, theories, and practices. Type (I)-competition processes can take place between
competition law regimes on the same jurisdictional level (horizontal dimension) and on different
jurisdictional levels (vertical dimension). Although it can suffer from imitation and incentive
problems, no systematic "race to the bottom"-problems emerge, as it is the case with the other
types of competition of competition laws. Consequently, this type (I) offers the opportunity for a
long-term process of improving the knowledge about effective competition laws.
69
IV. Towards a Decentralised International Multi-Level System of Competition Laws
What can we learn from our analysis for the discussion of an international competition policy
regime? What is the perspective that we would see as the most promising for further elaboration?
In the extensive debate on international competition policy in the last decade, three main avenues
to cope with international competition and globalizing markets have emerged:
70
(1) No systematic international competition policy: Despite a wide spread consensus about the
existence of problems in regard to the protection of competition on international markets, the
proponents of this view believe that the costs of an international competition policy regime are
higher than its benefits. Instead, the application of the effects doctrine combined with
discretionary bilateral cooperation between antitrust agencies is usually favoured.
                                                
69 As far as other types of competition of competition laws are working beneficially, they are supported by
type (I), as well as other types also support the working of type (I) through their additional incentives.
However, if other types lead to negative effects, as in the case of strategic competition policies, type (I)-
competition of competition policies can aggravate the problems (due to mutual learning about more
effective strategic competition policies).
70 We only give a very brief overview without a detailed discussion of features and divergent positions.
For more elaborated discussions of the fundamental possibilities to organise an international competition
policy regime see e.g. Jacquemin (1995), Guzman (1998), Kerber (1999), Grewlich (2001), Budzinski
(2002b, 2003), First (2003), and Fox (2003).
27 Kerber and Budzinski: Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competit
Produced by bepress.com, 201128
(2)  Convergence and harmonisation of national competition laws towards centralised
international regulation: Proponents of this view eventually strive for a uniform international
competition policy (“level playing field”) in the long run. The (realistic) way towards this first-
best solutions includes a step-by-step process of convergence of national competition policies in a
multilateral framework. Consequently, the focus lies on the harmonisation of substantial
competition law.
(3) Regulation of the allocation of jurisdiction within an (international) decentralised system of
competition laws: Proponents of this perspective believe that an international convergence and
harmonisation of substantial competition law is either not feasible or not desirable, except to a
very limited extent. A workable solution is viewed rather in an international consensus on
procedural rules for policy problems in multi-jurisdictional antitrust cases. These rules
particularly address the delimitation of jurisdictional competencies, conflict resolution, and
enforcement assistance.
Following our analyses, we would not agree to the first line of thought. The problems and
deficiencies of purely national competition policies in international markets, like loopholes in the
protection of competition (due to deficient extra-territorial enforcement), negative externalities
(due to beggar-my-neighbour-strategies), and cumulating competition law proceedings (due to
overlapping jurisdictions with resulting jurisdictional conflicts), will increase with the ongoing
globalisation of markets and firm behaviour. Competition of competition laws that is not guarded
by an appropriate international arrangement cannot be reliably expected to yield welfare-
enhancing results. The risk of deficient outcomes should not be neglected.
We are also reluctant in regard to the second perspective of substantial convergence and
harmonisation of national competition policies, which would eventually also imply a
centralisation of international competition policy. There are considerable costs of establishing a
substantial international competition policy regime and pessimism in respect to the possibility of
agreeing on harmonisation of substantial competition laws might be justified. However, this is
not our main concern. Instead, we are sceptical whether harmonisation (and centralisation) of
competition laws is the most appropriate (first-best) solution at all. Already the existence of
different goals of competition policy and varying economic and cultural conditions across
different countries call for severe doubts whether an uniform competition policy would be the
best one for all countries (irrespective of their state of development, their cultural background,
their size, their openness to international markets, and their institutions). Decentralised
competition policies might be more appropriate to cope with the enormous divergences in the
world economy.
However, the most important objection comes from our Hayekian perspective: our limited
knowledge about the most appropriate competition law regime and the necessity to secure its
flexibility and openness for improvements due to the ongoing technical and economic change.
This is a powerful argument against the establishment of an inflexible centralised or harmonised
solution. A decentralised system of competition laws would allow for parallel experimentation
with different solutions and mutual learning from their performance. In section III.1, this process
was analysed under the heading "type (I)-competition of competition laws". This Hayekian
"discovery procedure", however, requires a system of competition laws that is characterised by a
certain minimum extent of decentralisation and sustainable diversity.
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To some extent, the International Competition Network (ICN) embraces the advantages of
parallel experimentation and mutual learning. Its main features are the systematic exchange of
information and the evaluation of current competition laws and policies of the member
jurisdictions. Thereby, best practices concerning antitrust procedures
71, institutional
arrangements
72, and substantial rules
73 shall be identified and published. In doing so, the ICN
(implicitly) promotes type-(I) competition of competition laws through two channels: (1) the
creation of transparency concerning different solutions to competition policy problems enhances
the possibilities for interjurisdictional comparisons, and (2) the public identification of superior
solutions (best practices) alleviates their diffusion by putting "peer pressure" on the member
jurisdictions to imitate the best practices. However, it is not clear whether the ICN will develop to
be a road to ex-post harmonisation, because processes of imitation are strongly emphasised, while
the role of future innovations remains rather vague.
74 Taking the notion of a beneficial type (I)-
competition of competition laws seriously does not imply to once identify best practices and then
harmonise competition policies according to this standard. On the contrary, the knowledge
problem leads to the necessity to ensure that an international system of competition laws
produces variety and generates new knowledge.
Nevertheless, how can a decentralised approach to competition policy be made compatible with
the necessity to solve the many problems that result from the current situation of multiple,
independent national competition laws? In our view, the most promising perspective is the
development of a consistent international multi-level system of competition laws. Within this
system, substantial competition rules and enforcement agencies might exist on two or three
different jurisdictional levels (like, for example: international level, European level, national level
(within the EU)). Although the competition policies on these different levels should remain (to a
considerable extent) independent from each other (decentralisation), a coherent institutional
framework should exist for the whole multi-level system that helps to reduce gaps in the
protection of competition, to resolve conflicts between different competition policies (by
internalisation of externalities), and to save transaction costs by limiting parallel proceedings. It is
crucial that this multi-level system of competition laws works as an integrated system. Although
it cannot be denied that a minimum consensus about the basic principles of competition policies
is also a precondition for such an international system, the main focus is on the development of
the institutional framework for making this decentralised system work in a satisfactory way. In
that respect, this approach fits into the above-mentioned third perspective for international
competition policy, namely searching for an international consensus in regard to the regulation of
the allocation of jurisdiction in trans-border antitrust cases.
                                                
71 See, for example, the activities of the working group on the merger control process in the multi-
jurisdictional context, subgroup on merger notification and review procedures.
72 For example, concerning the independence of competition authorities, the meaning of regional
institutions, and institutional settings for advocacy (working groups on capacity building and competition
policy implementation and competition advocacy role of antitrust agencies).
73 For example, concerning standards for merger prohibition like "substantial lessening of competition",
"creation or strengthening of dominant market positions", and "public interest" (working group on the
merger control process in the multi-jurisdictional context, subgroup on the analytical review framework).
74 For a more elaborated analysis, see Budzinski (2002a, 2003).
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One cannot deny that so far there is no elaborated concept for a multi-level system of competition
laws that would allow detailed policy conclusions to be derived. However, if we accept that a
sustainable two- or three-level system of competition laws should be attained, the economic
theory of federalism can be applied for addressing the problem of the appropriate mixture of
centralisation and decentralisation within such an international multi-level system of
jurisdictions.
75 The primary questions are: what kinds of competition problems should be dealt
with on what jurisdictional level, e.g. the international level, the European or the national level?
What extent of centralisation and decentralisation should be chosen in regard to substantial
competition rules, on the one hand, and in regard to the enforcement of competition rules
(competition authorities, courts), on the other hand?
76 Particularly the geographic scope of
competition problems (externality problems), but also (static and dynamic) economies of scale,
transaction costs, the extent of local knowledge, and the homogeneity / heterogeneity of the aims
of competition policies are some of the criteria that can be used for determining the optimal
balance between centralisation and decentralisation.
Since also the positive and negative effects of regulatory competition can influence the
workability of a decentralised multi-level system, our analyses of the different types of
competition of competition laws are also an important contribution to this question. We have seen
that type (I)-competition of competition laws, allowing for parallel experimentation and mutual
learning, can be used as a powerful argument for a more decentralised system. One may ask what
kind of institutional arrangements could help to channel the learning processes into a beneficial
direction. Although type (II)- and (III)-competition of competition laws can lead to processes of
improving competition laws, they can also suffer from severe deficiencies (strategic competition
policies, prisoners' dilemmas), leading to the danger of a deterioration of competition laws. While
the application of the effects-doctrine could impede those negative effects (if it were fully
enforceable), it also considerably limits the potential positive effects of these types of
competition of competition laws. Perhaps it is possible to develop more sophisticated rules,
which are better able to differentiate between the positive and the negative effects of these types
of competition of competition laws. Since it is expected that type (IV)-competition of
competition laws has predominantly negative effects, a rule that would allow a free choice
between competition laws cannot be recommended. On the whole, "competition of competition
laws" can play its most important role in the discussion on international competition policy as a
powerful argument in favour of a decentralised system of competition laws.
However, the development of a concept for an appropriate institutional framework for an
international multi-level system of competition laws will require much further research work.
77
Particularly necessary is the development of rules for the horizontal and vertical delimitation of
                                                
75 See in more detail Kerber (2003) and for other first approaches Van den Bergh (1996) and Van den
Bergh/Camesasca (2001, pp.125). For a general attempt to apply the criteria of federalism theory to legal
rules (legal federalism), see Kerber/Heine (2002); for a first attempt to apply the concept of a multi-level
system of legal rules to European contract law, see Grundmann/Kerber (2002).
76 For example, in the EU there are simultaneously processes of centralisation and harmonisation of
substantial competition rules and processes of decentralisation regarding their enforcement.
77 Nevertheless, first steps have already been done. Both the attempts to establish a decentralised system of
enforcement of European competition law within the EU and the efforts to agree on procedural rules for
national merger reviews on a global level can be viewed as treating particular aspects of this task.
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competencies of the competition policies within this international multi-level system of
competition laws. The effects doctrine and its modifications by applying principles of positive
and negative comity as well as other explicit rules for the horizontal and vertical delimitation of
competencies can be viewed as starting-points for the development of a consistent set of rules for
an international multi-level system of competition laws.
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Abstract
We analyse whether "competition of competition laws" can be a feasible concept that might play
an important role in the discussion about an international order for the worldwide protection of
competition. Drawing on the general theory of regulatory competition, we distinguish between
four different types of "competition of competition laws": (I) competition of competition laws via
mutual learning (yardstick competition), (II) competition of competition laws via international
trade, (III) competition of competition laws via interjurisdictional competition, (IV) competition
of competition laws via free choice of law. Our main result is that the working of competition of
competition laws depends crucially on the type of competition and on the institutional framework.
Whereas type IV can be expected to lead to a deterioration of competition laws (race to the
bottom), the analyses in regard to types II and III render mixed results: jurisdictions have
incentives either to improve the protection of competition or to carry out different kinds of
strategic competition policies that weaken goods competition and can lead to prisoners' dilemma
problems on the global level. These deficient forms of competition of competition laws can only
be avoided by appropriate institutional safeguards. Our contention is that especially type I-
competition of competition laws is very important, because it can be seen as a process of parallel
experimentation with different competition policies that allows for mutually learning (yardstick
competition) and, therefore, for a process of improving competition law regimes in the long run.
These beneficial effects of type I represent a powerful argument against centralisation and
harmonisation. Therefore, in respect to the design of future international competition policy, we
would recommend the striving for a decentralised international multi-level system of competition
laws (federalism in antitrust).
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